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ESSAY
ORIGINALISM
Cass R. Sunstein*
Originalism might be defended on two very different grounds.  The first is that it is in some
sense mandatory—for example, that it follows from the very idea of interpretation, from having a
written Constitution, or from the only legitimate justifications for judicial review.  The second is
that originalism is best on broadly consequentialist grounds.  While the first kind of defense is not
convincing, the second cannot be ruled off limits.  In an imaginable world, it is right; in our
world, it is usually not.  But in the context of impeachment, originalism is indeed best, because
there are no sufficiently helpful precedents or traditions with which to work and because the
original meaning is (at least) pretty good on the merits.  These points are brought to bear on
recent defenses of originalism; on conflicts between precedents and the original meaning; on
conflicts between traditions and original meaning; and on nonoriginalist approaches, used
shortly after ratification.
INTRODUCTION
I have two goals in this Essay.  The first, and the narrower, is to square
two convictions: (a) there is a strong argument for originalism in the context
of the Impeachment Clause and (b) there is no strong argument for original-
ism in the context of the Equal Protection Clause.  (I mean the two clauses as
examples of sets of provisions for which originalism does and does not make
sense.)  The second, and the broader, is to suggest that originalism must be
defended pragmatically, which means (in my understanding) that it must be
defended on the ground that it will produce good consequences.  In imagi-
© 2018 Cass R. Sunstein.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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nable worlds, that defense would be convincing.  But it is not convincing in
our world, at least not as a general rule.  (I will qualify this conclusion,
because the answer depends on what, exactly, originalism is taken to entail.)
The two goals are related.  The pragmatic argument for originalism is
most powerful under two conditions.  First, there is nowhere else to turn with
respect to interpretation of the constitutional text, in the sense that other
legally relevant materials are absent.  Judges or other interpreters lack prece-
dents or traditions that can be taken to help solve interpretive puzzles.  Sec-
ond, the original meaning is excellent, or at least good or good enough, and
it is far from clear that judges or other interpreters can improve on it.1  One
way to put it is that the original meaning is a reasonable focal point.  Another
(and in my view preferable) way to put it is that in such cases, originalism has
low decision costs, at least compared to imaginable alternatives, and it also
has low error costs, again compared to alternatives.  (Pragmatists like to focus
on decision costs and error costs.)
It follows that the pragmatic argument for originalism is not strong
under mirror-image conditions, in which interpreters have relevant prece-
dents or traditions, and in which the original understanding is pretty bad and
judges or other interpreters are clear that they can improve on it.  In such
cases, nonoriginalist approaches will have acceptably low decision costs
(because of those precedents or traditions) and, under plausible assump-
tions, they will have lower error costs as well (because the original under-
standing is pretty bad).
Harder cases arise in which only one of the two conditions is met, and I
will have something to say about such cases as well.  My basic conclusion is
that if precedents or traditions are both longstanding and clear, the argu-
ment for rejecting them, by reference to the original meaning, is usually
quite weak.
Two clarifications before we begin.  First, I will argue that any approach
to interpretation must be defended on the basis of its consequences.  But I
mean this claim to be ecumenical, in the sense that the idea of “conse-
quences” should be taken very broadly.  It need not be identified with utilita-
rianism or welfarism.  It might include ideas about rights and self-
government.  We might well be able to obtain an incompletely theorized
agreement on some approach to an interpretation—that is, an approach that
obtains support from different theoretical foundations.2
Second, my central argument leads to the following question: Within the
(broad) constraints of the concept of interpretation, and within the con-
straints of existing law governing that topic,3 shouldn’t judges do whatever
1 Changed circumstances might render the original understanding less than good.  I
am assuming that they have not done that.
2 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (2d ed.
2018).
3 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1079, 1143–44 (2017).  Baude and Sachs convincingly argue that existing law limits judicial
freedom to produce new approaches to interpretation; judges cannot choose approaches
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they deem best?  If what judges deem best is in fact best, the answer should
be obvious: yes, at least if we have a suitable and suitably broad conception of
what is best.
The problem, of course, is that what judges deem best may not be best.
Theories of interpretation must be developed with close reference to the risk
of judicial fallibility.  One of the attractions of originalism, at least for some
people (including the present author), is that it is highly responsive to that
risk;4 other theories of interpretation can claim to be similarly responsive.  In
evaluating originalism, I will emphasize the importance of taking account of
judicial fallibility.
I. WHAT IS ORIGINALISM?
There is of course a voluminous literature on originalism and in particu-
lar on what it entails.5  Reasonable people, committed to originalism in the
abstract, disagree about how best to understand that commitment.  In recent
years, there has been an outpouring of illuminating work on the topic.
Today’s originalism is not your grandfather’s originalism, or even your
father’s, and probably not your older sister’s.
The origins of originalism are intriguing and in some ways surprising.
The term was first used by Paul Brest in an article that purported to be, and
in some ways seemed to be, devastating to the whole idea.6  Notwithstanding
Brest’s objections, the idea was enthusiastically taken up by President Rea-
gan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese and his Office of Legal Counsel.7  At
that point, originalism seemed to be a highly political weapon in a highly
political war over the future direction of the Supreme Court.  Whether right
or wrong, originalism served as a foundation for an objection to the Warren
on the fly.  We should therefore make a distinction between two questions: (1) What
should a judge do in a particular case?  (2) From the standpoint of outsiders evaluating a
claim about interpretation, what approach is best?  For the first question, the judge is
bound by the law of interpretation; for the second, the outsider is evaluating existing law
and not bound by it.  I will try to keep the two questions separate here.  Attempting to
evaluate originalism as an approach to constitutional law, I focus mainly on question (2).
With respect to question (1), originalism has been rejected in numerous important areas,
and to that extent, the law of interpretation forecloses judicial resort to it.
4 Note, however, that there is strong evidence that originalism does not eliminate a
significant role for judges’ political inclinations. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE
OF ORIGINALISM 165 (2013).
5 For a valuable account, see Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Histor-
ical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Solum, The
Fixation Thesis]; Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning and Con-
stitutional Practice (Mar. 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215 [hereinafter Solum, The Constraint Principle].
6 Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204
(1980).
7 See Edwin Meese III, Attorney Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association
(July 9, 1985), in THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y, THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION 1, 9–10 (1986).
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Court and to Roe v. Wade.8  It seemed to provide an intellectual basis (or, far
less charitably, a cover) for embracing conservative results in constitutional
law, and hence it was no surprise that it had (and has) far more appeal to the
political right, and its academic and judicial analogues, than to the political
left.
Whether fairly or unfairly, many of the critics of originalism took it to be
politically motivated and result-oriented, notwithstanding its claim of neutral-
ity.  Importantly, and in response to some serious objections, there was a shift
from a focus on “original intent” to a focus on “original meaning.”9  But the
political valence appeared clear, at least to many observers, sympathetic or
not.  A clue: at meetings of the Federalist Society, originalism often had a
prominent place; at meetings of the American Constitution Society, not so
much.10
At least in the law journals, the longstanding political drama has (I
think) been quieted by some of the most interesting current work on
originalism, which seems to proceed under a veil of ignorance, and hence to
abstract from, and even not to answer, the question whether it leads to partic-
ular results.11  We might even give it a name: Veil of Ignorance Originalism.
In the hands of some of its best contemporary defenders and expositors,
the idea of originalism has also become quite capacious, so that it can accom-
modate a wide range of modern doctrines that seem, at first glance, to be
forbidden on originalist grounds.  If we insist on a distinction between inter-
pretation and construction, and find a large “construction zone,”12 there
might well be a large overlap between certain forms of originalism and cer-
tain forms of nonoriginalism.  I aim to limit the level of complexity and
detail,13 and to understand originalism as committed to the simple idea, on
which there is now a near consensus, that interpreters are bound by the origi-
nal meaning of constitutional provisions.14
8 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9 See Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified The-
ory of Originalism 8 (Jan. 17, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049056.
10 A recent search for events related to “Originalism” on the Federalist Society and
American Constitution Society websites produced 178 results and 5 results, respectively.
11 See Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 5; Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra
note 5.
12 See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 5.
13 Public meaning originalism is the dominant approach, but there are other versions
with some support, including (1) continued support for intentionalism, see Larry Alexan-
der & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation Is
an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 969 (2004), (2) original methods originalism, see
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 769 (2009), and (3)
original law originalism, see Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 875 (2015).
14 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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A. Semantic Originalism
That conception of originalism leaves many open questions.15  On a very
thin view, what governs is the original semantic meaning, understood as the
meaning of the words in the English language at the time.16  Call this Seman-
tic Originalism.17  If the words “domestic violence” did not originally mean
spousal abuse, then they cannot mean spousal abuse today.  If the words
“equal protection” originally had nothing to do with condoms, then they can-
not now have anything to do with condoms.  If the English language changed
radically, so that “due” meant “awesome,” “cruel” meant “wonderful,” and
“vested” meant “wearing a vest,” the meaning of the Constitution would not
change, because the original semantic meaning is what governs.
Is Semantic Originalism correct?  In the cases that I have given, it seems
to be.  Generally it is.  But it does not capture all of our actual practice.  Con-
sider three examples:
1. The federal government is not governed by the Equal Protection Clause,
which applies only to the states, and yet the Due Process Clause is said to
have an “equal protection component” forbidding the federal govern-
ment from discriminating on the basis of race and sex.18
2. The First Amendment says that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech,”19 and yet the protection of freedom of speech
is applied to the executive branch and the courts.
3. If we are Semantic Originalists, it will not be easy to defend the conclu-
sion that the Equal Protection Clause forbids racial segregation in public
parks and public golf courses; at the time of ratification, the word “pro-
tection” had a specific meaning.
With respect to each, I would not reject our current practice, and the
examples support David Strauss’s argument that our constitutional principles
emerge from a common-law process in which even the text is not always deci-
sive.20  We should therefore agree that, in some ways, our practice confounds
15 I have referred to recurring questions, on which there is a significant literature,
about the size of the “construction zone” and about what is to be done within it. See gener-
ally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453
(2013).  For a careful, highly illuminating discussion of the construction zone, and of the
origins and development of originalism more broadly, see Barnett & Bernick, supra note 9.
16 See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); Jack M. Balkin, Framework
Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 552 (2009) (“Fidelity to
‘original meaning’ in constitutional interpretation refers only to the first of these types of
meaning: the semantic content of the words in the clause.”).
17 My understanding of the term is thinner than that in Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic
Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 07-24, 2008), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244.  I have learned a great deal from
Solum (but I fear not enough).
18 See generally Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
19 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
20 See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).  It is true that on originalist
grounds, one or more of these results might be rescued under other provisions of the
Constitution, such as the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
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Semantic Originalism.  Nonetheless, it is usually true that judges act in accor-
dance with it.  But if it is taken as I have described it here, it is generally trivial
in the sense that it rarely dictates results that nonoriginalists would reject.
B. Historical Context Originalism
On a much thicker view, the original meaning is not limited to semantic
meaning.  It captures what the relevant English speakers, at the time, would
have understood the words to mean in their context.  The much thicker view
is that the original meaning goes beyond the original semantic content of the
constitutional text and includes an understanding of the historical context,
used to eliminate ambiguity.21  Call this Historical Context Originalism, to
which most contemporary originalists subscribe.22
Suppose, for example, that “the freedom of speech” did not include
commercial advertising or libel and that “the equal protection of the laws”
had nothing to do with school segregation or sex discrimination.  If so,
originalists would be inclined to say that the issue is at an end.  It should be
clear that if the historical context is decisive, originalism would have a great
deal of bite.  But there is a complication, to which I now turn.
1. Expectations About Applications
An important question for Historical Context Originalism is raised by
the role of public expectations about the application of the text to particular
issues.  As originalists are aware, things can get messy here.
We might think that if the Equal Protection Clause was not originally
understood to forbid racial segregation or sex discrimination, then that is the
end of the matter, even if the original semantic meaning of the term would
not have forbidden the contrary view.  On the premises that underlie Histori-
cal Context Originalism, that conclusion seems attractive: the original meaning
of a constitutional provision is coextensive with the originally expected applications.
But another view, even more attractive and now held by most originalists, is
that originalism does not necessarily entail that constitutional interpretation
is settled by the originally expected applications,23 which are evidence of
original meaning but not decisive.
The most plausible way (and I think the only way, consistent with Histor-
ical Context Originalism) to make sense of this view is to suggest that in its
21 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 9.  In the philosophy of language and theoretical
linguistics, the role of context in the production of meaning is called “pragmatics” and is
contrasted to “semantics.” See Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional The-
ory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1124–39 (2015).  In my view, Solum has done the most powerful,
subtle, and illuminating work on these issues.  For better or for worse, I am trying to
bracket some of the subtleties for purposes of the current discussion.
22 For helpful discussion, see Barnett & Bernick, supra note 9.
23 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292–93
(2007).  An especially helpful discussion is found in Christopher R. Green, Originalism and
the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555 (2006).
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historical context, the original meaning of a constitutional provision might
have been taken to outrun the originally expected applications.24  For exam-
ple, those who ratified the free speech provision might have taken it to be a
broad concept, capable of evolution over time, or a delegation of authority to
the future (including judges).  If so, use of the originally expected applica-
tions would actually be inconsistent with the original meaning.  On original-
ist premises, the crucial point is that the original meaning is a question of
fact—a matter of history.25
As originalists are also aware, the historical question might be exceed-
ingly difficult to answer.  Suppose that we want to know whether, in 1789, the
freedom of speech was understood by those who ratified the Constitution to
be defined by reference to the originally expected applications.  If you took a
group of ratifiers, you would probably get an assortment of reactions, includ-
ing “yes,” “no,” “we haven’t really thought about that,” and “what exactly do
you mean?”  But for some constitutional problems, the historical question
might not be difficult at all.
2. A Thought Experiment
To sharpen the issue, take the text of the never-ratified Equal Rights
Amendment:
“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.”26
24 Green, supra note 23, has relevant discussion.  See also the helpful and convincing
discussion in Solum’s The Fixation Thesis about narrow interpretations (identifying original
meaning with expected applications) and broad interpretations (identifying original
meaning with broad concepts):
From the perspective of originalism, the question is which of these two competing
interpretations provides the actual communicative content of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  What kind of evidence bears on this question?  One kind of evi-
dence is based on armchair speculation about which interpretation is more likely,
given our knowledge of the communicative situation and our general knowledge
of the human situation: call this kind of evidence “armchair speculation.”
Another kind of evidence is based on linguistic facts (patterns of usage during the
Reconstruction Era) and context (the circumstances in which the Fourteenth
Amendment was drafted and ratified): call this kind of evidence “historical facts.”
Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 5, at 46.  Consistent with Historical Context Original-
ism as I am understanding it, Solum urges that we should focus on historical facts. Id. at 47
(“That evidence will be found in historical fact—that is, evidence about how the relevant
language was actually being used at the time and evidence about the context in which the
language was used.”).
25 See Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 5, at 12 (“Interpretation is an empirical
inquiry.  The communicative content of a text is determined by linguistic facts (facts about
conventional semantic meanings and syntax) and by facts about the context in which the
text was written.  Interpretations are either true or false—although in some cases we may
not have sufficient evidence to show that a particular interpretation is true or false.”).
26 H.R.J. Res. 33, 115th Cong. (2017).
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Let us suppose that the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was in fact rati-
fied in, say, 1980, and that at some point in the future (2015, 2030, 2050,
2100) the following questions arise: (1) Does the ERA forbid same-sex bath-
rooms?  (2) Does the ERA forbid discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation?  (3) Does the ERA forbid discrimination against transgender persons?
(4) Does the ERA forbid meat eating?  (5) Does the ERA require gender
quotas for women, to assure that they are adequately represented in certain
domains?
In 1980, it is reasonable to say that among those who voted to ratify the
ERA, all five questions would receive a firm “no” answer.  I would also say that
for some of the questions—say, (2)—the percentage of “yes” answers would
not be trivial, but would be far lower than fifty percent.  To the extent that we
are speaking of originally expected applications, the five questions are easy.
Now suppose, however, that the ratifiers are asked: Does the meaning of the
Equal Rights Amendment freeze your current understanding of its reach, or does it
entail a general concept whose reach changes over time?  My guess is that they would
respond with some version of the former, but it is not at all clear that most
people would have ready answers to that question, and responses could well
depend on exactly how the question is framed.  If people were informed, or
if they speculated, that a changing reach could produce results that they
would deplore, they would not welcome the idea of a changing reach.  But if
people believed that a changing reach would result in increasingly enlight-
ened judgments about the real meaning of “equality of rights under the law,”
they might think that a frozen meaning would be a mistake.  In other words,
their answers would depend on what information they have and what
assumptions they would make about how history would run under different
interpretive regimes.
Consider in this regard the words of Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing in
the 2015 case that ruled that all states must recognize same-sex marriages:
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.  The
generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its
dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting
the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.  When new
insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a
received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.27
Is Justice Kennedy an originalist?  On one view, he certainly is, because
he is speaking for the “generations that wrote and ratified” constitutional
provisions, which, on his view, “entrusted to future generations a charter.”
But did they, really?  Again, originalists will insist that the answer is a fact,
which is entirely fair—but it might prove very hard to know what that fact is
and Justice Kennedy might well have it wrong.  (If you forced me to guess, I
would say that he was indeed wrong.)
27 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
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For Historical Context Originalism, things are relatively easy if constitu-
tional provisions were plainly meant to be coextensive with their expected
applications.  But the historical question might turn out to be tough to
answer.  None of this should be taken as a decisive objection to originalism,
or anything close to it.  The point is only that originalism might leave chal-
lenging questions—again, as originalists are well aware.28
3. Blurred Lines
To the extent that originalists see some constitutional provisions as
broad concepts or as delegations, the line between originalism and
nonoriginalism becomes blurry in practice.29  It might even evaporate, in the
sense that in actual cases, originalists and nonoriginalists might not much
differ about how to proceed.30
But suppose, plausibly, that some constitutional provisions cannot be
seen that way.  Suppose that, originally and in context, the First Amendment
was not taken to be a broad concept, and was understood not to protect
against libel laws, or was taken to be limited to prior restraints.  Suppose too
that originally and in context, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
were not understood to be general terms capable of evolution and were
clearly taken to have nothing to say about same-sex marriage.  If so, matters
are at an end.  That is sufficient for my purposes here.
28 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 9, has valuable discussion.
29 See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 5, for a valuable treatment of why
this is so.
30 Recall the importance of the distinction between interpretation and construction,
emphasized by some contemporary originalists. See supra note 13 and accompanying text;
see also William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2352
(2015) (“[A] version of originalism is indeed our law.  That version is a somewhat inclusive
version of originalism—a version that allows for some precedent, for some evolving con-
struction of broad or vague language.  At the same time, that version is not infinitely inclu-
sive—it allows for precedent and evolving interpretations only to the extent that the
original meaning itself permits them.”).
If the words “somewhat inclusive” and “some evolving” are taken in a certain way, the
argument is not self-evidently wrong.  At the same time, countless decisions are inconsis-
tent with the original meaning, as Baude himself seems to suggest. See William Baude &
Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 GREEN BAG 2D 103, 108 (2016) (listing a number of
cases and principles that seem to violate the original meaning, including the “one person,
one vote” rule).  To that extent, originalism is not our law. See STRAUSS, supra note 20; see
also, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992);
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
To be sure, it is possible for originalism to be our law even if some particular decisions
are hard to defend on originalist principles.  The broader point is that, in any year, the
original meaning of the Constitution is unlikely to have “bite” in even one constitutional
decision of the Supreme Court, and it is rare for the Court even to inquire into it.  In my
view, those facts make it difficult to urge that originalism is our law, even if the Court rarely
says, in terms, “Our ruling today is inconsistent with the original meaning, and we just do
not care about that.”
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4. Impeachment
I am going to be speaking a fair bit about impeachment, and I will be
defending an originalist approach to the Impeachment Clause.31  As I under-
stand it, and consistent with originalism as generally defended and practiced,
that approach asks: What did the words “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” originally
mean?32  And as I understand that question, the best answer (as a matter of
history!) is relatively concrete, not in the sense that it is an exhaustive list of
all imaginable cases, but in the sense that it covers most real-world ones and
gives us a principle that has far more specificity than the semantic meaning
of those words.33
One way to put that answer is to insist that as a matter of history, the
ratifiers emphatically did not understand “high Crimes and Misdemeanors”
to be a reference to some abstract concept whose particular meaning would
change over time.34  They understood it to include certain abuses of author-
ity (such as abuse of the pardon power or invasions of liberty) and not to
include certain bad actions (terribly mistaken judgments and poor adminis-
tration).  If there are gray areas, they are to be resolved with reference to a
clear principle—and in terms of sheer numbers, the gray areas are domi-
nated by those that are not gray at all.  In other words, Historical Context
Originalism imposes sharp constraints on the meaning of “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”
II. WHY ORIGINALISM?
Why should anyone be an originalist?  We can distinguish between two
kinds of answers.  The first avoids any arguments about consequences and
says that originalism is built into something, or intrinsic to something—per-
haps the very idea of law, perhaps the very idea of a Constitution, perhaps the
very idea of a written Constitution, perhaps the very idea of interpretation,
perhaps the very idea of obedience to law, perhaps the only legitimate justifi-
cation for judicial review, perhaps the only way to capture what the Constitu-
tion “really means.”35  On that approach, nonoriginalists are refusing to
follow the Constitution and are essentially amending it.  The second kind is
pragmatic and focused directly on consequences, broadly understood.36  It
focuses on what will happen under different interpretive regimes.  It urges
31 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
32 Id.
33 The principle can plausibly be seen as a way to help resolve cases within the con-
struction zone.
34 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE (2017).
35 See Randy E. Barnett, The Golden Mean Between Kurt & Dan: A Moderate Reading of the
Ninth Amendment, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 897, 909 (2008).
36 See JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CON-
STITUTION (2013).  An assortment of consequentialist arguments can be found in Solum,
The Constraint Principle, supra note 5.
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that originalism will produce better results, on balance, than any alterna-
tive.37  (Recall that the notion of “results” is meant to be ecumenical.)
A. Choice and Choicelessness
The first kind of answer discussed above builds on something that is
true: any interpreter has to interpret the Constitution’s text.  If a judge pays
no attention to the words of the Constitution, she is not engaged in interpre-
tation at all.  Though it is less than entirely clear, we might also agree that
any interpreter has to pay attention to the semantic meaning of the words,
taken in their original context.  If the word “protection” comes to mean “cell
phone” or “guard dog,” it would not be permissible for a judge to understand
the Equal Protection Clause to mandate something with respect to cell
phones or guard dogs.  In that sense, Semantic Originalism, as I have under-
stood it here, does seem to follow from the very idea of interpretation.
(Recall, however, that some established doctrines violate Semantic Original-
ism, and I approve of those doctrines, which requires a qualification of the
claim that Semantic Originalism is mandatory.)
Is anything in the original understanding mandatory beyond this?  Is His-
torical Context Originalism also mandatory?  That is not easy to see.  Suppose
(or stipulate, for purposes of argument) that if we follow originalism, the
Free Speech Clause must be taken to be limited to prior restraints; that the
Equal Protection Clause must be taken to allow racial segregation; that the
religion clauses must be understood to permit compulsory school prayer.  If
interpreters rely on the text, but not on the original meaning, they have not
amended the Constitution unless the original meaning is part of the Constitution—
and that is the very question that we are debating.  There is no need to take the
original meaning to be part of the Constitution, or to insist that we need to do
that if we are to engage in interpretation at all.38
37 Baude, supra note 30, argues that originalism is “our law.”  If he is correct, he is not
making a consequentialist argument on behalf of originalism, and he is not quite making
an argument about choicelessness in the sense in which I am understanding that kind of
argument.  (Compare: the invalidity of bans on same-sex marriage is just our law.)  I have
suggested that originalism is not our law, see supra note 30, but that is a separate claim.
38 In defense of originalism, Randy Barnett urges:
I start with the proposition that the Constitution was put in writing so it could
provide the law that governs those who govern us.  A written constitution cannot serve
this purpose if the very people who are to be governed by it can themselves, alone
or in combination, alter the meaning of the constraints imposed upon them.
None of us can alter the meaning of the statutes or regulations imposed upon us
without going through the amendment process, and neither can our rulers, who
are supposed to be our agents.
Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 417
(2013).  With respect, this seems to me a stipulation, or perhaps a circle.  A constitution’s
text is in writing and provides the law that governs us even if it does not mean what it
originally meant.  Those who put the Constitution in writing do not have the authority to
settle the question of how it should be interpreted, unless we think they should.
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It is common to “interpret” a judicial precedent to mean something
other than what it originally meant to the author, to the Court, or to the
public.  Nothing in the ideas of fidelity to law, of constitutionalism, or of
interpretation compels us to read texts in accordance with their original
meaning.39  To be sure, we might choose to understand fidelity or constitu-
tionalism in a way that makes original meaning authoritative.  But that is a
choice, and it is not compulsory.  For example, Ronald Dworkin understands
interpretation to be a matter of placing the existing legal materials in their
best constructive light.40  Whether or not he is right, it is hard to argue that
his approach does not involve interpretation at all.41
Justice Scalia contends that we must be originalists if we want to adhere
to the only principle that legitimates judicial review.42  In his account, the
Barnett might be making a pragmatic point about the not good consequences that
would follow if constitutional meaning changes over time—fair enough.  But the meaning
of the U.S. Constitution has changed over time, and it still serves the purpose of providing
the law that governs those who governs us.
39 Lawrence Solum argues that “[t]he Fixation Thesis is based on our commonsense
understandings of the way that communication works.  When we communicate using lan-
guage, we rely on linguistic conventions and context—and both are time-bound.”  Solum,
The Fixation Thesis, supra note 5, at 76.  On that point, Solum is convincing.  But in constitu-
tional law, we might not rely on those commonsense understandings, in the sense that we
might depart from Historical Context Originalism in interpreting such phrases as “equal
protection” and “freedom of speech.”  I do not believe that “commonsense understandings
of the way that communication works” are decisive against such departures (though in so
saying, I might be objecting to what Solum calls “the Constraint Principle”). See Solum,
The Constraint Principle, supra note 5.
40 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
41 “As several of the newer originalists have written, if we start with the premise that
the Constitution is binding law, then perhaps our task should simply be to read the Consti-
tution and do what it says.  Sometimes it may result in constraints, and sometimes it may
not.”  William Baude, Essay, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2213,
2228 (2017) (footnote omitted).  The problem with this view is that it is question begging
to say that “to read the Constitution and do what it says,” we must rely on original meaning.
We can read the Constitution and do “what it says” without adverting to that meaning.
Whether we should do that cannot be resolved by pointing to the importance of reading
the Constitution.
42 The principal theoretical defect of nonoriginalism, in my view, is its incompati-
bility with the very principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.
Nothing in the text of the Constitution confers upon the courts the power to
inquire into, rather than passively assume, the constitutionality of federal stat-
utes. . . . Central to that analysis [of judicial review in Marbury], it seems to me, is
the perception that the Constitution, though it has an effect superior to other
laws, is in its nature the sort of “law” that is the business of the courts—an enact-
ment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual devices familiar to
those learned in the law.  If the Constitution were not that sort of a “law,” but a
novel invitation to apply current societal values, what reason would there be to
believe that the invitation was addressed to the courts rather than to the
legislature?
Antonin Scalia, Essay, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989) (foot-
note omitted).  Justice Scalia might well be right to suggest that the ratifiers did not invite
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power to strike down legislation is legitimated if, and only if, the Constitution
“has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual devices familiar to
those learned in the law.”43  But why?  Fixed meanings are neither necessary
nor sufficient for the legitimation of judicial review.
If the Constitution has a fixed original meaning, and it is thoroughly evil
and rotten, and it was adopted by dead people well over 200 years ago, is it
legitimate?  If the meaning of the Constitution is not fixed, and if the docu-
ment with unfixed meaning serves “We the People” exceedingly well as its
meaning departs from the original one and evolves over time, is it illegiti-
mate?  We do better, I think, to avoid abstract talk of legitimacy, and instead
to investigate consequences—acknowledging that protection and preserva-
tion of democratic self-government, properly understood, is an important
consequence.44
Here is a way to put the point, ventured tentatively but with some convic-
tion: those who believe that Historical Context Originalism is mandatory are
(I think) in the grip of a picture.  It is a bit like the “duck or rabbit” image,
which looks like a duck, if you see it a certain way, or a rabbit, if you see it
another way.45  Some people have a picture of constitutional interpretation
such that originalism just is what it means to engage in it (legitimately).  But
that is only one way of looking at things.  It may be right, but it is optional.
Whether it is the right option depends on the consequences.
It is tempting to defend originalism by reference to analogies.  Suppose
that you work for a principal; you are his agent, perhaps his employee.  He
gives you certain directions.  You might well be an originalist, certainly as a
presumption, and perhaps more than that: if he tells you to do something
and his instructions are not clear, you will try to figure out what he meant.
(To be sure, that question might lead you to original intentions rather than
original meaning, but let us treat that as a detail.)  Perhaps judges, and
others governed by the Constitution, should be seen as agents (or fiducia-
ries).  They must follow instructions, which means that they must be
originalists.
The analogy goes too quickly.  The role of an agent can be understood
in different ways, and if an agent should or must be an originalist, it must be
for broadly pragmatic reasons.  On plausible assumptions, the principal-
agent relationship usually works best, or usually is best, if agents are original-
ists.  Of course we could imagine assumptions, also plausible, on which
courts to “apply current societal values”; that is a question of history.  But even if they did
not issue any such invitation, the question is whether a nonoriginalist approach to interpre-
tation makes our constitutional system better, rather than worse, and that question cannot
be answered by asking about the very principle that legitimates judicial review.  It should
be clear that in my view, the principle that legitimatizes judicial review is consequentialist:
judicial review has good consequences.  If it did not, we should not embrace it.
43 Id.
44 See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 5.
45 The “duck or rabbit” image originates in JOSEPH JASTROW, FACT AND FABLE IN PSY-
CHOLOGY 295 (1901).
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agents should adopt some other approach.  Perhaps their principal is aware
of what he does not know; perhaps he wants his agent (a doctor, a lawyer, a
construction company) to exercise some discretion, on the ground that the
agent’s decisions will be better if he has the freedom to do that.  Perhaps the
principal has not thought that question through.
The point is not to make a claim about the proper role of agents.  It is
only to suggest that any justification of a particular view about that role can-
not rest content with saying that an agent “just is” one thing or another.
B. Pragmatism (Herein of Consequences)
The pragmatic argument on behalf of Historical Context Originalism
(hereinafter originalism, for short) is far more plausible; it certainly cannot
be ruled out of bounds.  In imaginable circumstances and under imaginable
assumptions, it is convincing.46  Under imaginable assumptions, it is even
convincing in our world.  We may not be able to rule out the possibility that
things would have been as good, or better, if judges had always been
originalist.47
For general orientation, let us suppose that if the Constitution is under-
stood to mean what it originally meant, it will be good or even excellent.  Let
us suppose too that if judges depart from the original understanding, they
will make a terrible mess of things.  The idea of a terrible mess can be under-
stood in many ways, but roughly, law will become unpredictable; judges will
compromise the rule of law; judges will be tyrannical in a relevant sense;
judges will be insufficiently protective of rights; judges will make moral judg-
ments that do not deserve respect; and judges will restrict the power of self-
government in ways that cannot be defended.48  Let us suppose finally that to
the extent that the Constitution, as originally understood, does not protect
(what many people now consider to be) a sufficiently ample set of rights, the
democratic process will pick up the slack, as it has, for example, through
46 A more pragmatic argument can also be found:
A democratic society does not, by and large, need constitutional guarantees to
insure that its laws will reflect “current values.”  Elections take care of that quite
well.  The purpose of constitutional guarantees—and in particular those constitu-
tional guarantees of individual rights that are at the center of this controversy—is
precisely to prevent the law from reflecting certain changes in original values that
the society adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable.
Scalia, supra note 42, at 862.
47 As we shall see, much depends on what originalism means or entails.  In addition, it
is a very different question whether judges should not be or become originalist.  We might
think that if judges had always been originalist, things would be fine or better, without also
thinking that judges should become originalist starting now.
48 Solum contends that “concern for the rule of law and for legitimacy do provide the
strongest reasons of political morality for originalism.”  Solum, The Constraint Principle,
supra note 5, at 85.  Solum makes plausible arguments that the rule of law and democratic
self-government (my term, not his) are best promoted by originalist approaches.
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legislation akin to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act.49
In such circumstances, there would be strong claims on behalf of
originalism, and it is not easy to see why anyone would reject those claims.  It
follows that the real debate between originalists and nonoriginalists is
intensely pragmatic.  In some respects, it is about counterfactual history.  It is
not about anything abstract, but about what is being supposed.50  Those who
reject originalism think that as originally understood, the Constitution is not
excellent enough; that if judges depart from the original meaning they will
not make such a mess; and that judicial departures from the original mean-
ing are essential to create a well-functioning democracy and a sufficiently
robust system of rights.  Suppose that these claims are right.  If so, original-
ism would be the right approach in an imaginable world, but not our own.
Rejection of originalism does not, of course, specify an alternative
approach.  We could imagine several.  Some people favor a “democracy-rein-
forcing” approach to judicial review, calling for an aggressive judicial role to
protect rights that are central to the democratic process, or to protect groups
that are systematically disadvantaged in that process.51  Other people think
that courts should adopt a strong presumption in favor of constitutionality
and strike down legislation only when the violation is unambiguous.52  Still
other people think that courts do (and should) adopt a common-law
approach, proceeding incrementally and with close reference to precedents
and traditions.53
All of these approaches raise serious questions, and while I will return to
them, I do not mean to answer those questions in this space.  It is both true
and important that any final conclusion must be comparative.54  Perhaps
originalism is not so great, but perhaps any alternative is worse.  I have not
49 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012)),
invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 and 47 U.S.C.).  These points hardly exhaust the consequentialist argument
on behalf of originalism.  Nonoriginalist approaches might weaken democratic processes
by shifting energy from politics to courtrooms.  Such approaches might politicize the judi-
ciary and undermine its (legitimate) role.
50 Some qualifications emerge from Solum in The Constraint Principle, which outlines
arguments (involving tyranny and the rule of law) that appear to involve general principles
and that do not seem to be rooted in suppositions. See Solum, The Constraint Principle,
supra note 5.  In the end, I think that they are, at least in the sense that the weight to be
given to those arguments depends on some empirical projections.  But it is true that if we
value the rule of law, we might find significant advantages in a system in which constitu-
tional meaning does not change.  Note again that even if originalism would have been a
good or acceptable course starting in, say, 1800, it does not follow that becoming original-
ist would be a good or acceptable course starting in, say, this present year.
51 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1981).
52 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006).
53 See STRAUSS, supra note 20.
54 See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 5, at 50.
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ruled that conclusion out of bounds.  For now, the only point is that in terms
of consequences, it is easily imaginable that at least one alternative, and
maybe at least two, are superior to originalism.
III. IMPEACHMENT
A. Originalism When You Have Nothing Else
To focus on my methodological concerns, I am going to make some
long stories shamefully short.  The Constitution states that the President, the
Vice President, the cabinet, federal judges, and many other officials are
impeachable for “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”55  Those words could be
interpreted in different ways.  For example, a contemporary English speaker
might understand those words to mean “very bad violations of the criminal
law,” even if they are technically misdemeanors—as distinguished from felo-
nies.  In fact, that seems like the most natural reading for a contemporary
English speaker.  In other words, an action is not a legitimate basis for
impeachment unless it is a crime.
Alternatively, such a speaker might understand the words to mean “bad
crimes and other bad actions.”  That interpretation is linguistically admissible
if we understood the word “misdemeanors” to refer not to technical viola-
tions of the criminal law, but to wrongful actions that reach a certain thresh-
old of wrongfulness.  We could take these alternative interpretations to
suggest the possibility of a continuum: from a minimalist understanding of
high crimes and misdemeanors where what is required is a violation of the
criminal law—and a truly terrible one at that—to a maximalist understand-
ing where all that is required is a judgment by the House of Representatives
that the relevant official has done something that is bad enough.  What is the
right point on the continuum?  A nonoriginalist will have some answers (see
below), but none of them are obvious, or obviously correct.
For their part, originalists (as I am understanding them here) would
reject both of the alternative interpretations, would reject both poles of the
continuum, and would have no enthusiasm for the idea of a continuum.  On
the basis of what history tells us, they would insist that “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors” refers to “egregious abuses of public power.”56  That was the
original meaning of the phrase.  For that reason, a crime is not required.  At
the same time, it is not enough that, say, the President has engaged in bad
actions.  To qualify as impeachable offenses, such actions must involve abuses
of distinctly presidential authority (as opposed to, say, income tax fraud,
shoplifting, or perjury about sexual conduct), and they must rise to a high
level of egregiousness.
An originalist approach to the Impeachment Clause answers most ques-
tions.  It demonstrates that President Richard Nixon was impeachable and
55 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
56 SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 124.
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that President Bill Clinton was not.  If an originalist approach leaves some
difficult questions, it has the merit of explaining why they are difficult.57
An originalist approach to the Impeachment Clause has two advantages.
First, it greatly simplifies life.  Without the original understanding, where
would interpreters go?  The conventional legal materials are absent.  (I will
turn to a counterargument shortly.)  At least, there are no judicial prece-
dents on which interpreters could draw.  Second, the original understanding
is good, even excellent, and it is not clear that contemporary interpreters
could improve on it.
For example, a minimalist approach to the Impeachment Clause would
forbid use of the mechanism when the President has grossly abused his
authority without committing a crime.  The President could go on vacation
in Rome for a year, lock people up because of their skin color, make wars on
a pretext and for political purposes, or pardon people who promised that
they would campaign for his reelection.  Refusing to allow impeachment for
such abuses would be pretty terrible.
A maximalist approach would allow the House to invoke the mechanism
simply because a majority of its members dislike the President and are able to
identify some action or omission that is, in their view, very bad.  That would
also be pretty terrible.  If you do not agree that a minimalist or maximalist
approach would be pretty terrible, and if you enthusiastically embrace one or
the other, then the argument for originalism in this context is definitely
weakened.  But if you do agree, originalism is not easy to reject.
Here is a related point: in the context of impeachment, originalism pro-
vides a good focal point, one that allows people to coordinate on something
that is useful and good, whatever their differences.  In game theory, focal
points solve coordination problems, even in the absence of communica-
tion.58  For lawyers and judges, the original meaning might serve a similar
function.59  In the context of impeachment, the coordinating function seems
especially important.  In my view, it is not decisive—we need to inquire into
consequences more generally, and coordinating onto something terrible
would not be a good idea, even if it is focal.  But in the context of impeach-
ment, taking the original meaning as focal is very far from terrible.
I am aware that many originalists would not be at all satisfied with this
argument on behalf of impeachment originalism.  In their view, it is too con-
sequentialist: opportunistic, contingent, result oriented, an exercise of discre-
tion disrespectful of the arguments that make originalism mandatory.  But if
my argument thus far is correct, no other kind of argument on behalf of
originalism makes much sense, unless it is a very thin version, limited to origi-
nal semantic meaning.
57 I realize that these claims about originalism and the Impeachment Clause raise
many questions.  If you think that the claims might not be correct, take them as stipula-
tions, designed to clarify the methodological issues.
58 See Robert Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points, 105 ECON. J. 533, 533 (1995).
59 See STRAUSS, supra note 20 (arguing that text is similarly focal).
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B. Impeachment Nonoriginalism
Nonoriginalist approaches to the Impeachment Clause could take vari-
ous forms.  Let me sketch three.
1. Active Liberty
Suppose that we believe, with Justice Stephen Breyer, that constitutional
provisions should be interpreted with reference to the idea of “active lib-
erty.”60  Offhand, that approach would lead to the view that participants in
the political process could define “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” however
they wish.61  Would that be a good idea?
Almost certainly not.  It would be deeply destabilizing.  In a period in
which the opposing party (whether Republican or Democratic) is not known
for self-restraint, there is a grave risk that this approach would allow resort to
the impeachment mechanism in circumstances in which the real driver is not
misconduct, but instead policy disagreement or political gain.62  That would
be a serious problem for national institutions.  It would convert our system of
separation of powers into something quite different from what it now is and
something much worse.
2. Traditions
Suppose that we believe, with Justice Felix Frankfurter, that traditions
can operate as a “gloss” on the Constitution, so that the meaning of constitu-
tional provisions might be settled by longstanding practices, even if the result
is very different from the original understanding.63  If so, we would want to
ask: What are the relevant traditions with respect to impeachment?  To sim-
plify, let us imagine two possible answers to that question.  First, an investiga-
tion of American history reveals a clear understanding of what count as high
crimes and misdemeanors.  The nation has converged on that understand-
ing.  Second, an investigation of American history reveals no clear under-
standing of what count as high crimes and misdemeanors.  The relevant
practices are a mess.
If traditions reflect a clear understanding, and if that understanding
diverges from the original understanding, we have a legitimate question:
Should the tradition yield to the original understanding or vice versa?  I will
turn to that question in due course.  But if the relevant practices are a mess,
60 See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
(2005).
61 That is not entirely clear.  After all, the President is elected, and so ready invocation
of the impeachment mechanism might compromise the idea of active liberty.  To the
extent that the idea turns out to be indeterminate, the argument in favor of its use is
weaker still.
62 The Clinton impeachment is an example and a warning. See SUNSTEIN, supra note
34, at 101–04.
63 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
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we have no such question.  In my view, the tradition is a mess.  It does not say
anything that we can use; it does not suggest convergence on any kind of
principle.64  If that is right, and for present purposes, it should be taken as a
stipulation, then interpreters have nothing with which to work.
3. Moral Readings
Ronald Dworkin argues for a “moral reading” of the Constitution.65  On
that view, interpreters are bound by the text, but they are authorized to give
the text the reading that is best from the moral point of view.66  Under that
approach, it would be necessary to ask: What understanding of the Impeach-
ment Clause makes it the best that it can be?  One moral reader might con-
clude that a maximalist understanding of the clause would be best; another
moral reader might favor a minimalist understanding.  They would argue
with one another.  On Dworkin’s view, that is not so bad—in fact it is not bad
at all.  They are arguing about exactly the right question.
Originalists are not enthusiastic about Dworkin’s claim.  In fact, they are
appalled by it.  Instead of asking about the morally best understanding of
constitutional provisions, they want to ask: What was the original meaning?
In the context of impeachment, I agree with them, but it will immediately be
observed that my account of the occasions for originalism has a Dworkinian
dimension.  I have not argued that interpreters should stick with the original
understanding if it is awful.  Indeed, my account converges with Dworkin’s if
it is taken to suggest that interpreters should follow the original understand-
ing if, and because, it is morally best.  And if that is the approach, then
originalism as such is essentially irrelevant.  What is doing the work is a moral
judgment about what is best—not the original understanding.  It just turns
out that the original understanding is best.  What a nice coincidence!
My response is that the originalist reading of the Impeachment Clause is
emphatically not based on an independent judgment that it is best.  The
requirement is much softer than that.  Two judgments are needed.  The first
is that the original understanding is good or good enough; the second is that
it is not obvious that an alternative view would be much better.  For example,
a reader of the Constitution might prefer a maximalist interpretation of the
Impeachment Clause on Dworkinian grounds, but might conclude, on
grounds of humility, that she ought to follow the original understanding.
For the Impeachment Clause, a reader might (and I think should) decide to
be an originalist even if she thinks that the original meaning does not make
the text the best that it can be.
64 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 34.
65 See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION (1996).
66 See id. at 10.
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C. Clause-by-Clause Originalism?
A possible response to the argument I am making here would take the
following form.  To be sure, originalism makes more sense for some provi-
sions than for others.  If we are pragmatists with respect to interpretation,
that conclusion seems inevitable.  But there is something wrong with provi-
sion specific interpretive choices.  A theory of interpretation should be Con-
stitution general, not provision specific.
To see why this objection might be right, imagine that a judge
announced that she would be an originalist with respect to the free speech
provision in the context of prior restraints, but a moral reader in the context
of libel law, and a Thayerian in the context of pornography.  It would be
natural to ask: Isn’t that an objectionable form of picking and choosing?67
Shouldn’t you choose your interpretive method and stick with it?  Isn’t that
more objective?
In a way, these questions are misleading.  On pragmatic grounds, it
might indeed be best to stick with a single interpretive method, if that would
reduce decision costs and error costs.  Case-by-case choices among
approaches to interpretation might seem messy and ad hoc—and might dis-
guise political preferences.  But clause-by-clause choices are far less awkward.
Indeed, current law reflects such choices.  For the Second Amendment, the
Court has been quite originalist,68 as it has not been for the First.69  Indeed,
a pragmatic approach of the kind that I have sketched here seems to account
for a great deal of existing practice.
IV. WHEN ORIGINALISM IS TOUGH TO DEFEND (IN A HURRY)
Suppose that it turned out that if the original meaning is authoritative,
racial segregation is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.70  Suppose
too that no other provision of the Constitution forbids racial segregation.  Or
suppose that the First Amendment, read in accordance with the original
meaning, prohibits licensing schemes and other prior restraints, but does not
forbid subsequent punishment for speech.  In either case, it would be diffi-
cult to argue that judges should return to original understanding.71
The simplest reason is that originalism would have bad consequences.  It
would lead to a weaker and worse system of rights.  If judges are not bound
by the original understanding, they do have somewhere to turn: the body of
precedents that judges have themselves developed.  To be sure, elaboration
of those precedents leaves them with a degree of discretion.  We will con-
67 I use the conventional phrase, but there is a big difference between picking and
choosing. See generally EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT ET AL., NORMAL RATIONALITY (2017).
68 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
69 Cf. STRAUSS, supra note 20, at 51–61 (“[T]he First Amendment . . . has been a tre-
mendous success story in American constitutional law.  But where did [its] successful prin-
ciples come from?  They did not come from the text of the Constitution.”).
70 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
71 For valuable discussion, see STRAUSS, supra note 20.
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tinue to see changes over time, but that is not so bad.  If it turns out to be a
price, it is a price worth paying.  And it might not be a price at all.  It might
be a gift.
To the extent that originalism is understood not to have bad conse-
quences, of course, this objection has no force.  We could imagine a view of
history such that originalism would not have bad consequences, in the sense
that if we reran constitutional law counterfactually, originalist constitutional
law would not be bad at all.72  Perhaps it would be pretty good.  It is also
possible that originalism would have some bad consequences, but that over-
all, it would have good consequences.73  Perhaps it would lead to weaker pro-
tection of freedom of expression, but a stronger system of democratic self-
government.  It is admittedly inadequate to point to a few results that
originalism would not have made possible, or would now question, and then
to declare victory.  The question must be answered at the level of the system
as a whole, not that of particular cases.
We have also seen that some forms of originalism emphasize semantic
meaning and that others take constitutional language at a high level of
abstraction (on originalist grounds), in a way that would authorize contem-
porary understandings of the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amend-
ment.  These forms of originalism are not subject to the objection I am
making here.  Recall, however, that if it is taken in these forms, originalism is
close to nonoriginalism in the sense (crucial in my view) that the judicial role
is not more constrained.74
My answer to a simple question—is originalism good?—is therefore
equivocal.  As I have suggested, there is a big difference between two ques-
tions: (1) Should the Court have been originalist since, say, 1800?  (2)
Should the Court become originalist today?  To answer either question, a
great deal depends, of course, on what originalism is taken to entail.  We
have seen that question (1) is especially challenging because it requires us to
answer some questions about counterfactual history.  (I will return to this
point.)  I do not believe that American constitutional law would be better if
the Court had been originalist, but it is not easy to be confident on that
score, partly because of the challenge of specifying what originalism means,
and partly because of the challenge of rerunning history under different
assumptions.  Question (2) is a bit easier, because a turn to originalism would
be so destabilizing, and it is not clear how much or what would be gained by
it.  But I am more interested in identifying the relevant issues than in insist-
ing on particular conclusions.
72 For a superb discussion, see Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 5.
73 See id.
74 But see Baude, supra note 41, at 2214 (“[O]riginalist scholars today are much more
equivocal about the importance and nature of constraining judges.  This is a point that
may be obvious to those steeped in the latest originalist theory, but apparently cannot be
stated often enough or clearly enough to those who are not.”).  In my view, the argument
on behalf of originalism is much stronger if it is defended as a means of constraining
judges.
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V. CONFLICTS
I now turn to three sets of questions: (1) What happens when traditions
are in conflict with the original understanding?  (2) What happens when
judicial precedents are in conflict with the original understanding?  (3) What
happens when judges want to follow their own moral reading of a constitu-
tional provision, shortly after ratification?  Answers to these questions should
sharpen the pragmatic case for and against originalism.
A. Traditions vs. Original Meanings
Suppose that the United States has had a longstanding practice,
accepted by both Congress and the President.  Suppose that the practice,
while not inconsistent with the text, is in tension with or defies the original
understanding.  What then?  Some imaginable examples: (1) Congress enacts
legislative vetoes, and the President signs the relevant legislation, over a
period of many decades.  (2) The President uses military force, without con-
gressional authorization, over a period of many decades, and Congress, as
such, does not appear to object.  (3) Over a period of many decades, the
President makes recess appointments in circumstances that seem to defy the
original meaning of the Appointments Clause, and the Senate, as such, does
not appear to object.
We can distinguish a continuum of cases, and even provide a matrix,
depending on the clarity of the original meaning and the tradition.  In the
easiest cases, the original meaning is ambiguous and the tradition is clear.  In
the hardest, the original meaning clearly supports X and the tradition tends
to support not-X.  In the intermediate cases, the original meaning is best
understood to support X, but matters are not entirely clear; the tradition
tends to support not-X.
In my view, the tradition should presumptively prevail in all of these
cases.  If a tradition is longstanding, there is probably a good argument on its
behalf, certainly in the domain of separation of powers.  On Burkean
grounds,75 the tradition has weight; it has been accepted by many minds.
Acceptance by Congress and the President, over an extensive period, suggests
that it has real benefits.  Why should the original meaning overcome it?
On pragmatic grounds, that is a difficult question to answer.  The most
important qualification points to the possibility that while Congress and the
President have accepted the practice, Americans generally lose from it.  The legislative
veto question can be understood in these terms.  If the one-house or two-
house veto gives rise to a risk of factionalism or a threat to liberty, then the
longstanding practice might not be so important.76  It follows that traditions
are not self-justifying, and if there is a rights-based or structural objection to
them, they might have to yield.  But the reason is not that the original under-
75 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING DOCU-
MENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE (2009).
76 See Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regula-
tion: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977).
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standing is a trump card.  It is that there is a rights-based or structural objec-
tion to them.
B. Precedents vs. Original Meanings
Suppose that we have a series of precedents that defy the original mean-
ing.  The Takings Clause is an arguable example, to the extent that it treats
some diminutions of the value of property as “takings” even if there is no
physical invasion.  Suppose that by 2017 (and long before), the judiciary had
settled the issue in favor of the view that the clause is not limited to physical
takings and that it includes “regulatory takings.”  Suppose that on the origi-
nal meaning, it turns out that the clause was so limited.  Should the judge
follow the precedents or the original meaning?
If the original meaning identified with the Constitution, the answer
might seem to be easy: follow the original meaning.  But even on originalist
grounds, that might not be so clear.  Perhaps the original meaning was that
the Takings Clause offered a general concept, not a particular conception
limited to physical takings.  Or suppose that the original meaning incorpo-
rated respect for stare decisis and so authorized judgments to (continue to)
depart from the original meaning.  But suppose that is a dodge—an effort to
avoid the problem.  Suppose that the precedents really do defy the original
meaning.
If all a judge has is a flat conflict between the two, the precedents
deserve priority.  Respect for precedents has the familiar justifications: it pro-
motes stability in the law, protects reliance interests, and limits decisional
burdens imposed on judges.  By itself, the original meaning is not sufficient
to overcome those justifications.  Suppose, for example, that originalists dis-
covered that the Second Amendment does not protect an individual right to
own guns, that the Fourteenth Amendment does not ban racial segregation,
and that the First Amendment does not protect commercial advertising.
Because the argument for use of the original meaning is pragmatic, such
discoveries would not justify undoing the fabric of existing law.
To be sure, the stare decisis principle can be overcome.  If a series of
precedents has produced chaos, if it is based on palpably false assumptions,
or if it is otherwise plainly wrong, a precedent can be reconsidered.  But
inconsistency with the original meaning is not sufficient justification.
C. Originalism, Originally
Suppose that it is 1875.  Suppose that the Equal Protection Clause has
been ratified and that the original meaning permits racial segregation.  By
this I mean that “We the People” take the meaning to be that racial segrega-
tion is acceptable.  Suppose too that there are no judicial precedents or rele-
vant traditions.  Suppose finally that a judge believes, on principle, that the
Equal Protection Clause is far better if it is read (as the text allows) to forbid
racial segregation.  What then?
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Here is a case in which use of the original meaning can be supported by
the absence of anything else with which to work—but in which the judge
believes that the original meaning leads to an approach that is morally infer-
ior.  We could imagine a pragmatic justification for insisting on respect for
the original meaning understanding: the constitutional order is likely to be better if
judges defer to the original meaning, because their own judgments are not reliable.  A
judge who expands on that meaning, or who contracts it, might well make
things worse.  But if we had real faith in judicial capacities, we might think
that the original understanding has to yield.  On pragmatic grounds, that
argument seems hard to resist if we had such faith.
But that approach seems to miss something.  A constitutional amend-
ment is an exercise of authority by “We the People.”  Is it really acceptable for
judges, a week after an amendment was ratified, to repudiate the general
understanding of what that exercise of authority entailed?  Is that legitimate?
I confess that my own intuitive reaction is a firm “no, that is not acceptable.”
But if the argument here is correct, that reaction is best understood as a kind
of heuristic.  If it is to be defended, it is because it reflects a second-order
judgment, which is that judicial departures from the original meaning, made
soon after ratification, are more likely to be wrong than right.
D. The Second Amendment: Testing Cases
Let us briskly test some of these claims by reference to the Second
Amendment.  Assume that it is 2007.  Assume also that the Supreme Court
has not authoritatively ruled whether the Second Amendment includes an
individual right to possess firearms.  Assume finally that the text of the Sec-
ond Amendment is not clear, and that consistent with that text, and with its
original semantic meaning, the Supreme Court could interpret it either way.
We could imagine conscientious judges, focused on the history, reaching
opposing conclusions on whether, as an original matter, the Second Amend-
ment did include such an individual right.  Suppose that a judge reaches a
particular conclusion.  Is that the end of the matter?
The argument here can easily be taken to suggest that the answer is
“yes.”  We are essentially stipulating that judges do not have any other place
to look; precedents and traditions do not speak with any kind of clarity.  (If
they did, we would face a different problem, addressed above.)  To be sure,
the problem would be harder if the judge believes, with great conviction, that
if the Second Amendment is taken in accordance with the original meaning,
it is far worse than it would be if it were not so taken.  A judge might believe
that according to the original meaning, the Second Amendment does not
include an individual right to possess firearms, but that interpretation is mor-
ally abhorrent.  Or she might believe that according to the original meaning,
the Second Amendment does include that right, but so taken, the Amend-
ment is morally abhorrent.
On the stated assumptions, and without a lot of clarity about what is
morally better, the judge should follow the original meaning.  With a lot of
clarity about what is morally better, the issue becomes more complicated.
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One more time: any judgment about what to do will have to depend on our
faith in the moral convictions of judges.
VI. COMPARED TO WHAT?
I have been exploring whether originalism can be defended on prag-
matic grounds and (mostly and with multiple qualifications) answered that,
in our world, it cannot be.  But it would be reasonable to object that the
question is not whether originalism is great or even good.  It is insistently
comparative: Is originalism better than the alternatives?77  Nothing here
rules out the possibility that for all its flaws, the answer is “yes.”
The question is not simple to answer.  One reason is that we need to
know whether we are dealing with an idealized version of originalism (and
the alternatives) or instead a more realistic version.  In practice, originalism
might be faithful to the historical sources (for better or worse), or it might be
used in a way that reflects the ideological commitments of the users,78 or it
might be mostly faithful but sometimes not.  Those who ask the comparative
question probably need to take a stand on what originalism would look like
in the real world—and if they do not, they should acknowledge that they are
using an idealized version.  Of course, the same things can be said about the
alternatives.  An idealized version of any alternative to originalism might be
good, but a real-world version might be horrendous.
What are the alternatives?  I have briefly referred to some possibilities.
Some people who reject originalism think that judges should uphold legisla-
tion unless the violation is unambiguously clear.  Let us call it Thayerism,
after its original academic defender, James Thayer.79  As stated, Thayerism is
an incomplete theory of judicial review, because it also requires a theory of
meaning, which would enable us to know whether the violation of the Consti-
tution is clear.  We could even imagine Thayerian originalists, who would say
that unless a practice violates the original meaning, it must be upheld.  There
is nothing incoherent about this position.  On one view, it fits comfortably
with one justification for originalism, which is to simplify decisions and
reduce judicial discretion.
To distinguish Thayerians from originalists, rather than to marry them,
let us understand Thayerians to say that if a practice does not unambiguously
violate the text, it is constitutional.  On that view, for example, restrictions on
private gun ownership are fine even if the original meaning suggests that
they are not.  Is Thayerism, thus understood, superior to originalism?  Note
that Thayerism, thus understood, would produce a severely truncated system
of rights: school segregation would be fine, bans on school prayer would be
fine, regulatory takings would be fine, sex discrimination would be fine.
77 See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 5.
78 See CROSS, supra note 4.
79 See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
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Some people, most prominently John Hart Ely,80 think that judges
should take on an especially strong role in order to protect democracy
itself—by, for example, striking down restrictions on the right to vote and
protecting groups that are at a systematic disadvantage in the political pro-
cess.81  Is democracy-reinforcing judicial review, thus understood, superior to
originalism?  There is probably no way to answer that question without
exploring normative questions and also making some empirical projections.
Is it good, for example, to require a regime of “one person, one vote”?  What
would Supreme Court Justices actually do, if they were firmly committed to
democracy-reinforcing judicial review?  Might they strike down wonderful
things and uphold horrific things?  (What have they actually done?)
Pragmatists think that the best way to answer the comparative questions
would be to see what the world would look like if judges were committed to
one or another approach.  Ideally, we would have a randomized controlled
trial in which American history runs along various different tracks, with vari-
ous different approaches.  As between theories, we could begin with pairwise
comparisons, and ultimately we could try to envision some kind of horserace.
If judges had been originalists since (say) 1900, what would American law
look like?  If judges had been Thayerians, would racial segregation still exist?
What would be the state of freedom of speech?  Of freedom of religion?  Of
property rights?
The problem is that because history is only run once (outside of science
fiction), we cannot easily get clear answers to such questions.  Counterfactual
history is notoriously challenging.82  It is tempting to say that other things
being equal, Thayerian judges, and perhaps originalist judges, would prevent
all sorts of desirable developments from occurring—rights-protecting deci-
sions that we now honor and celebrate.  In fact, I tend to believe that is true.
But history might be like a spider’s web; if you pull on one part (the Supreme
Court does not strike down racial segregation), something will be felt in
another part (perhaps the movement for racial equality will start earlier or
push harder).
There is another possibility.  If we rerun history, and if most judges had
been originalists, perhaps things would not be so different from how they are
now, and perhaps they would not be different in a very bad way.  Perhaps
they would be different in all sorts of good ways.  Who knows?  Some original-
ists are at pains to say that under their approach, “fixed points” in American
constitutional law, such as Brown v. Board of Education,83 would come out the
same way.84  Even if the Equal Protection Clause could not have its current
interpretation, the Privileges or Immunities Clause would have filled the
80 See ELY, supra note 51.
81 See id. at 181–83.
82 See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 5, at 88.
83 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
84 See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947 (1995).
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gap.85  An originalist United States of America might turn out to look very
similar to the current United States of America, and perhaps it would not be
any worse; it might even be better.86  If this is so, then originalism might
stand vindicated on pragmatic grounds.  A pragmatist might have to make
this confession: I have my hunches, but I am not sure whether our nation, and our
system of constitutional law, would be better if judges committed themselves to original-
ism starting in (say) 1880.  I have to be agnostic on that question.
For present purposes, let me offer some simpler conclusions.  Our own
practice is not originalist, and it is not Thayerian, and it is not democracy
reinforcing.  Or more precisely: It is one of these, and not another, on occa-
sion, but it is not consistently any of them.  As David Strauss has shown, our
constitutional tradition is a common-law tradition, developed by increments,
and allowing for significant departures from one decade to the next.87  Of
course a common-law tradition can take many different forms.  It could veer
right or it could veer left.  It could remain quite stable or it could allow for
significant changes.  It could have Thayerian or democracy-reinforcing fea-
tures.  It could be great or it could be horrible.
Our common-law tradition is not horrible, and, in some ways it is great.
I think, though I am not sure and cannot prove, that it is a lot better than
what we would have gotten, or would get, from originalism.88
CONCLUSION
If originalism has bite, it must be defended on the basis of its conse-
quences, broadly conceived, and the defense would make sense under imagi-
nable circumstances.  For orientation and simplification: If the original
understanding is excellent, and if judicial judgments about the (nonoriginal-
ist) meaning of the text would misfire in a relevant sense, then originalism
would be best.  Originalism would stand defended on consequentialist
grounds.  And indeed, some defenders of originalism speak in pragmatic
terms.89  Some originalists are also at pains to say that their preferred
approach would not endanger “fixed points” in constitutional law—perhaps
above all, the ban on racial segregation.90  They emphasize the real-world
risks that accompany nonoriginalist approaches.
85 See Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61 (2011).
86 See Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 5, at 98 (“[M]y claim is not that the
original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause supports contemporary constitu-
tional gender equality doctrine.  Rather, my point is that advocates of gender equality have
not, for the most part, engaged in a serious inquiry into the original public meaning of the
relevant provisions.  If this is so, then their belief that originalism ‘stacks the deck’ against
gender equality is not well founded.”).
87 See STRAUSS, supra note 20.
88 By this I mean Historical Context Originalism.  Other forms of originalism look like
nonoriginalism, from the pragmatic point of view. See BALKIN, supra note 16.
89 That is how I understand the argument in Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra
note 5.
90 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 84.
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I have not embraced originalism in general, and indeed I have suggested
that originalism usually lacks much appeal in our world, certainly if the sug-
gestion is that judges should now embrace it.91  On that count, my conclu-
sion is more qualified and tentative that I expected it to be—but there we
are.
In the context of impeachment, however, originalism does seem best.  In
that context, interpreters lack precedents or traditions with which to work.
In that context, adherence to the original meaning leads to an attractive
approach to the Impeachment Clause.  Under those assumptions, the case
for originalism is quite powerful on pragmatic grounds.
91 Because of the potential capaciousness of some forms of originalism, and the need
to study history to know what originalism specifically entails, I state this conclusion tenta-
tively; recall that some forms would avoid the consequentialist objections I have offered
here.
